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inconceivable. 1 The inverse is now true as people are breaking
free from their remote control shackles and turning to mobile
devices to receive programming on their own terms.2 Watching
television is still America’s favorite pastime and people are tuning
in at an average of 2.8 hours a day. 3 However, traditional
television viewers are steadily decreasing as younger
demographics shift towards alternative media outlets. 4 While
online services are growing significantly, online content constraint
is producing a glaring niche in the market for streaming broadcast
channels.
Two companies emerged as the frontrunners in the rush to
close the market gap and created a highly polemical copyright
battle in their wake.5 Aereo, started by media entrepreneur Barry
Diller, is a subscription-based system that allows users to watch
live television coupled with DVR capability online and on mobile
devices via a series of dime-sized antennae situated at the
company’s headquarters. 6 Alkiviades David launched Aereo’s
competitor FilmOn—formerly known as Aereokiller—to offer the
same type of service as Aereo.7 Remarkably, both systems operate
independent of cable companies. 8 Initially in litigation against
each other, the companies reconciled and now stand united against
1

See Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Channel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copyright Liability
for Internet Broadcasting, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 619, 633 (2000).
2
See American Time Use Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (June 20, 2013, 10:00 AM EDT), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.
nr0.htm.
3
Brian Stelter, Youth Are Watching but Less Often on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/media/young-people-are-watching-butless-often-on-tv.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4
See generally Graeme McMillan, Viewers Are Flocking to Streaming Video Content
– And so Are Advertisers, WIRED, Mar. 1, 2013, http://www.wired.
com/underwire/2013/03/streaming-video-advertising.
5
See Joe Mullin, As FilmOn is Shut Down by Courts, All Eyes Are on Aereo, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 10, 2013, 12:07 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/asfilmon-is-shut-down-by-courts-all-eyes-are-on-aereo.
6
See generally AEREO, http://www.aereo.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
7
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Barrydriller Content Systems, PLC, 915 F.
Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
8
See Emily Steel, FilmOn Launches New Remote TV Service, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb.
10, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af323520-9265-11e3-9e43-00144feab7de.html#ax
zz2uA43G8me.
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a rapid onslaught of broadcaster-brought copyright infringement
claims.9
Broadcasters were not initially threatened by Aereo or FilmOn
and expected easy legal victories against them. However, they
were blockaded by the Second Circuit’s Cartoon Network v. CSC
Holdings (“Cablevision”) public-performance decision. 10
Cablevision, a major cable operator, created a “remote storage
DVR system” (“RS-DVR”) through which users could record their
favorite shows, which were stored in a remote location available
for retrieval to viewers’ televisions through their remote controls.11
Responding to broadcaster fury, the Second Circuit ultimately
deemed unique single-subscriber systems as private performances
not equating to copyright infringement. 12 Although merely one
decision, Cablevision’s influence is potentially far-reaching.13 It
has already been credited with creating legal cover for cloud
computing processes, which enable services such as SoundCloud
and Apple iCloud to exist without first acquiring authorization
from copyright holders.14 This development has elicited scathing
reviews from some copyright scholars and support from others.15
Aereo and FilmOn were undeniably influenced by the Second
Circuit’s decision, albeit not favorably. As District Court Judge
Nathan stated in WNET v. Aereo, stare decisis prevented the court
from assessing Aereo with a clean slate and, therefore, the system
was deemed judicially permissible upon passing Cablevision’s
9

See Ross Todd, Aereo Makes Peace with FilmOn Founder Amid Network
Challenges, AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (Oct. 18, 2013, 10:48 AM),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/litigationdaily.
10
See generally Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008).
11
See id. at 124.
12
See id. at 139.
13
See Lee Gesmer, Aereo, Antenna Farms and Copyright Law: Creative Destruction
Comes To Broadcast TV, 18 No. 7 CYBERSPACE LAW. 16 (Thomson/LegalWorks, New
York, N.Y.) (2013).
14
See Daniel Schnapp, Legal Implications of Cloud-Based Distribution and
Consumption of Entertainment Content, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN
CYBERSPACE LAW, 2013 EDITION: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS,
CASE LAW, AND LEGAL STRATEGIES AFFECTING THE INTERNET LANDSCAPE (Aspatore
2013).
15
See Gesmer, supra note 13.
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doctrinal test.16 However, the California district court in Fox v.
Barrydriller was not persuaded—or bound—by the Second
Circuit’s decision, and used a different public performance test to
find in favor of broadcasters.17 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit in
Fox v. FilmOn issued a nationwide (with the exception of the
Second Circuit) injunction against FilmOn, leaving Aereo poised
to change the fundamentals of the television industry. 18 Aereo
CEO, Chet Kanojia, remains confident his system will prevail and
is busily expanding the service.19
Resolution of the public-performance conundrum now lies in
the hands of the Supreme Court, which recently granted certiorari
to determine which public-performance approach is correct and
whether Aereo and similar systems streaming unlicensed online
broadcast television violate copyright law.20 The present judicial
tension with respect to online streaming of broadcast television is
yet another chapter in a long and familiar tale of the judiciary
attempting to fit new technology into an outdated copyright
framework. As the story goes, while new innovation creates new
benefits and possibilities, it also creates unprecedented legal issues.
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court is ill-equipped
under the current copyright regime to solve the public-performance
conundrum in a manner that will protect copyright authors, reward
tireless technology pioneers, and provide for the public interest.
Part I will illuminate the theoretical underpinnings of copyright
law and public-performance jurisprudence, the cable industry’s
evolution, and previous online television efforts. Part II will
discuss the two conflicting public-performance approaches. Part
III proposes two remedies: (1) a legislative remedy calling for a
newly drafted Copyright Act including an online television
16

See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d. Cir. 2013).
See Gesmer, supra note 13.
18
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-CV-758 (RMC), 2013
WL 4852300, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2013).
19
See Emma Wollacot, An Android App Plus a Court Win: It’s Aereo’s Busy Day,
FORBES, Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2013/10/10/anandroid-app-plus-a-court-win-its-aeros-busy-day.
20
See Adam Liptak & Bill Carter, Justices Take Case on Free TV Streaming, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/media/supremecourt-to-hear-case-on-retransmission-of-tv-signals-by-aereo.html?_r=0.
17
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compulsory license and (2) a judicial remedy endorsing a
copyright principle-focused public-performance framework. Part
IV provides concluding thoughts on the interests at stake.
I. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: COPYRIGHT AND CABLE
Copyright claims influence the public experience in a multitude
of ways from the ability to use an iPod to the joy of catching a late
night rerun of a favorite Seinfeld episode. Historically, such claims
have been brought not only by authors struggling to maintain their
limited monopolies on works, but also by interest groups seeking
to control new technological innovations. 21 The influence of
Hollywood and the media and telecommunications industry on
copyright legislation and policy remains strong.22 In recent years,
however, the rise of the Internet has broadened the scope of
influence on copyright law and policy to new interest groups
outside the industry.23
A. Copyright
Copyright law is the result of early American efforts to accord
formal legal protection to the fruits of intellectual labor. The
Founders granted Congress the power to “promote Progress of
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Time to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” in recognition of the human mind’s far reaching
capabilities.24
At an early point, the judiciary recognized that authors and
This judicial
innovators equally benefit society. 25
acknowledgement, however, only made balancing the competing
interests of authors and innovators more difficult. Drawing the
line for protecting author rights has proven to be especially
21

See Brian D. Johnston, Rethinking Copyright’s Treatment of New Technology:
Strategic Obsolescence as a Catalyst for Interest Group Compromise, 64 N.Y.U ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 165 (2008).
22
See PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE
INTERNET 237 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012).
23
See id. at 236.
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 621 (1834).
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difficult. Although the authors’ statutorily granted exclusive rights
are entitled to copyright protection, offering authors the strictest
level of such protection does the public a disservice in chilling
innovation.26 On the other side of the coin, according innovators
too much deference damages authors’ incentive to create.
Although new technology is targeted as the stressor upon
copyright, it is the foundation of copyright law.27 If it had not been
for the invention of the printing press, there would be no new
works to speak of or protect. Yet innovators are often in
precarious positions when it comes to copyright litigation and may
be hesitant to claim their rights because they do not possess the
resources for litigation.28
In protecting the results of the “sweat of the brow,” early
copyright jurisprudence esteemed the individual effort expended in
a work’s creation.29 Copyright’s overarching goal, however, has
always been to enhance the public good.30 Indeed, while authors
provide the vehicle through which rights are delivered, the system
as a whole is designed to benefit the public at large.31 The greater
the public’s access to a diversity of information, the closer
copyright law is to serving its purpose. As described by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation in its amicus brief defending
Aereo, that litigation was not about Aereo but rather the public’s
choice in broadcast television.32
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the current codification of
American copyright law. 33 The Act protects “original works of
authorship in tangible forms of expression from which can be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated either directly
26

See Christopher Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation
Policy, 34 U.C. IRVINE J. CORP. L. 1259 (2009).
27
See id. at 1261.
28
See id. at 1272.
29
See generally Int’l New Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (holding the
Associated Press had a quasi-property right entitled to protection in the work put into fact
gathering although the facts themselves were not subject to copyright).
30
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 22:64 (2014).
31
See id.
32
See Brief for WNET v. Aereo as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
33
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 19, 1976).
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or with the aid of a machine or device.”34 Authors are granted
several—but not exclusive—rights, including the right to
reproduce copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, prepare
derivative works, distribute works by sale or transfer of ownership,
to display the work publicly, and to perform the work publicly.35
Although clarity is espoused as a copyright virtue, the judicial
definition of public performance has become increasingly murky.36
Section 106 of the Copyright Act codifies copyright authors’
exclusive right to perform their works publicly. 37 The public
performance right contains two prongs: the Public Place Clause
and the Transmit Clause.
The Public Place Clause
straightforwardly defines a public performance as a performance
that “takes place at a place that is open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of
family and social acquaintances is gathered.” 38 Congress has
clarified that semipublic places such as hotels, clubs, and schools
are considered public for copyright purposes.39
The Transmit Clause is at the heart of the present public
performance conflict. It provides that a public performance is to:
Transmit or otherwise communicate a performance
or display of the work to a place specified by clause
(1) or to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times.40
The legislative history emphasizes that “device or process”
encompasses all conceivable forms or combinations of wired and
wireless communication, and that each and every method of
34

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
See id.
36
See Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (1994) (stating that because
copyright enriches the public good by increasing access to public goods, copyright lines
must be demarcated as clearly as possible).
37
17 U.S.C. § 106.
38
Id. § 101.
39
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).
40
17 U.S.C. § 101.
35
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transmitting an image comprising a performance or display comes
under the scope of the Copyright Act.41
One of the judiciary’s first struggles with the publicperformance right concerned the transmission of content viewed
privately within a public commercial space, an issue addressed by
the Third Circuit in Columbia Pictures Industry, Inc. v. Redd
Horne, Inc.42 In Redd Horne, the defendants owned and operated
two video rental stores offering patrons the option to rent videos
for either home viewing or in-store viewing in private rooms. 43
The in-store option allowed customers to watch a film of their
choice alone or with a small group of friends in a room with
personal VCR service for a small fee.44 Plaintiffs did not contest
the rental service but claimed that the unauthorized exhibition of
the films within the private rooms infringed upon their exclusive
public performance rights.45 The panel did not reach the Transmit
Clause issue because the video store sufficiently fulfilled the
meaning of public space within the first clause. 46 Similarly to
Redd Horne, in Columbia Industries Inc. v. Aveco Inc., defendants
owned a video store featuring private viewing booths.47 The court
found that their case was not distinguishable because customers
controlled the VCRs in the booths whereas, in Redd Horne, store
employees controlled the VCRs from outside the rooms. 48 The
court also held that the service was a violation of owners’ publicperformance rights.49
The judiciary first addressed Transmit Clause technicalities in
On Command Video Corporation v. Columbia Pictures
Industries. 50 In On Command, a hotel wired each room to a
specific video player (“VCP”) enabling guests to choose videos to

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).
749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
See id.
See id. at 159.
Columbia Indus. Inc. v. Aveco Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 61 (3d Cir. 1986).
See id. at 62.
See id. at 64.
777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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watch through a centralized switchboard system. 51 Columbia
Pictures claimed that the system was infringing upon its exclusive
right to publicly perform its work. 52 The court rejected
defendants’ argument that the placement of wires throughout the
hotels sufficiently fulfilled the requirements of the Public Place
clause. 53
Moreover, the court proffered a definition of
“perform”—the first such definition provided by any court. The
court stated that because a “performance” is statutorily defined as
“the showing of images in any sequence to make the sounds
accompanying it audible[,]” a performance occurs where a
transmission is received but not where it is passing through. 54
Establishing that the performances only occurred within the private
hotel rooms, which were not relevant for the purposes of the Public
Place Clause, the court engaged in a Transmit Clause analysis.55
The court held that the system at issue constituted publicperformance infringement, because the works were still available
to the public at large, which included potential hotel guests.56
Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc.
brought the Redd Horne/Aveco discussion into the Internet Age.57
The service at issue, Zediva, allowed subscribers to stream
unlicensed copyrighted works on demand at extremely discounted
rates via an individualized DVD player housed in a data center.58
When a viewer would choose a film to watch, a specified DVD
player, similar to the VCP systems in On Command, played the
request.59 The private nature of viewers receiving programming at
home was not enough to negate the public availability of the
content and was also insufficient to overcome public-performance
claims.60

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

See id. at 788.
See id. at 789.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 790.
824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
See id.at 1007.
See id. at 1009–11.
See id. at 1010.
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Cablevision forever changed the copyright landscape of the
Second Circuit by introducing a new, transmission-centric publicperformance test. The controlling question for the Cablevision
court was whether the Cablevision design performed the work to
the public, and the court ultimately held that it did not because the
system design constrained receipt of the transmission to single
individuals. 61 The Cablevision court relied upon exhaustive
statutory interpretation to establish the scope of the publicperformance right because it found neither “performance” or “to
the public” to be expressly defined. 62 Because the statutory
language provides that parties must be “capable of receiving the
performance in order to be public” as opposed to “capable of
receiving the transmission,” the court held that a transmission in
itself is meant to be interpreted as a performance.63
B. Cable: Past and Present
A true appreciation of the interests at stake in the Aereo and
FilmOn litigations requires an understanding of cable systems and
their history. A cable system is formally defined as a facility that,
in whole or in part, receives signals transmitted or programs
broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations, and makes
secondary transmissions of these signals by wires or other
communication systems to subscription-paying customers.64 Cable
companies, satellite companies, and other content providers are
also called multichannel video programming distributors
(“MVPDs”).65
Ironically, much like Aereo and FilmOn, the cable industry
began as a pesky new innovation that sought to compete with
broadcast television.66 Broadcasters delivered signals over radio
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
61

See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 134, 139 (2d Cir.
2008).
62
See id.
63
Id. at 134.
64
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
65
See Marvin Ammori, Copyright’s Latest Communication Policy: Content Lock out
and Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 375, 376
(2010).
66
See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 165 (1968).
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before the first commercial cable system installation in 1950. 67
The poor reception, especially in rural areas, proved to be a less
than ideal content delivery method. 68 Community access
television (“CATV”) systems provided a novel solution by using
wirelines to deliver video signals. 69 Initially perceived to be a
local auxiliary to supplement broadcasting services, the rapid
expansion of this system demonstrated its potential to become a
national communications system.70
Despite broadcaster claims, the Supreme Court did not find
CATV systems liable for copyright infringement. CATV systems
secured two landmark victories, Fortnightly v. United Artists
Television and Teleprompter Corp v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, both of which were subsequently overturned by the
Copyright Act of 1976, but nevertheless gave rise to the industry
by allowing CATV systems to develop without judicial
impediment.71
Fortnightly presented the first major copyright battle for
content and set the precedent for judicial treatment of cable
systems.72 Broadcasters claimed that CATV signal retransmissions
via a series of antennas on hills for a flat monthly fee violated their
public-performance rights, yet the CATV system owners
contended that mere retransmission did not constitute
performance. 73 Adhering to the Copyright Act of 1909, which
lacked a statutory definition of a cable system, the Court
recognized the dubiousness of relying upon a statute lagging 60
years behind technological innovation.74 Finding no support in the
conventional performance definition, the Court looked to tests
beyond the ordinary scope of the Act to adjudicate properly.75 It
67

Michael Zarkin, Cable TV Deregulation Considered: An Exploration of Three
Theses, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 8–9 (2012).
68
See id.
69
See Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 161.
70
See id. at 163.
71
See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
72
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 401–02.
75
See id. at 398–99.
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rejected the appellate test measuring petitioner efforts enabling the
viewing and hearing of the copyrighted work, because a
quantitative measurement could potentially expose general public
actions to copyright liability, such as shopkeepers selling
televisions.76 Constraining copyright liability to industry players,
the Court attempted to place CATV systems within the existing
broadcasting process to determine the appropriate treatment. 77
This framework illustrated a fundamental difference between
broadcasters and viewers. 78 The Court observed that the
broadcaster merely supplied electronic signals whereas the viewer
provided the video/audio conversion equipment. 79 Because the
CATV systems provided equipment in the same manner as the
audience and merely made the signals more widely available, the
thin similarity to broadcasters was insufficient to constitute public
performance infringement.80
The subsequent Teleprompter decision briefly cemented the
precedent that CATV systems did not infringe broadcasters’ public
performance rights.81 Seminal changes to the CATV system since
Fortnightly, including selling commercials and original
programming, created newly significant overlap with
broadcasters.82 Petitioners argued the CATV evolution warranted
fresh judicial review under the Fortnightly comprehensive
functionality test for public performance infringement. 83 The
Court did not find the changes determinative despite the CATV
systems’ ability to effectively compete with broadcasters, because
such systems did not impact the baseline of signal retransmission.84
As the nature of the retransmission itself remained the same, the
changes did not possess a sufficient nexus to equate the systems to
a public performance infringement.85
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

See id. at 397.
See id. at 399.
See id. at 400.
See id. at 399.
See id. at 400–01.
See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 412 (1947).
See id. at 404.
See id. at 403.
See id. at 405.
See id.

2014]

COPYRIGHT COWBOWS: DIGITAL ONLINE TV

795

The FCC noted that the threat of adverse effects upon
broadcasters was too substantial to leave unaddressed, and asserted
jurisdiction by slowly implementing regulations in 1968.86 FCC
authority was unclear because the system’s novelty did not place it
in the clear-cut categories of a common carrier or broadcaster. The
Court ultimately affirmed that cable systems were subject to FCC
regulation.87 Specifically, the Court held the Communications Act
granted FCC authority to regulate and make available a rapid
nationwide and worldwide wire and radio communications service
applicable to interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio, placing cable systems directly in its purview.88
The FCC embraced the new judicial grant to regulate and
implemented a set of cable industry rules in the 1970s.89 Most
regulations were short-lived as they were either repealed or
substantially revised shortly between 1974 and 1980.90 There is no
singularly accepted explanation for why the FCC imposed and
revoked regulations so quickly. Some theorize interest groups and
other industry officials petitioned the FCC and pushed the “cable
fable,” painting the cable industry as a revolutionary technology
that could resolve social problems.91
Serious concerns with the existing cable regulations reflected
the legislative fear of creating effective competition between cable
and broadcasters, yet such concern refused to account for the
unique contours of cable technology, thereby limiting cable’s
ability to evolve by subjecting it to ill-fitting broadcast rules. 92
The technological difference proved to be too great to be ignored
by FCC policy, leading to legislative reform in the 1984 Cable Act.
The Act was created with the purpose of establishing a national
cable policy and established franchise procedures that would
assure growth, distribute power among competing governing
86

See Zarkin, supra note 67, at 3.
See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
88
See id. at 167.
89
See Zarkin, supra note 67, at 4.
90
See id. at 5.
91
See supra note 41.
92
John F. Gibbs & Todd G. Hartman. The Regulation of Convergence Technologies:
An Argument for Technologically Sensitive Regulation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2193,
2201 (2001).
87
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entities, promote competition and create wider information
diversity. 93 The cable industry’s exponential growth after the
passage of the Act and the increase in subscriptions created a host
of market-power issues targeted in the redrafted Cable Act of
1992, and such problems continue to plague the industry today.94
Vertical integration was an issue of particular concern then and
remains so today.95 Cable systems started as distribution platforms
for broadcast channels yet now own programmers.96 They use this
heft against smaller programmers to engage in integration by
requiring them to sell company equity to obtain carriage.97 This
also creates a stronger incentive to favor affiliated programmers,
thus creating severe roadblocks for smaller, non-cable affiliated
programmers.98
The cable industry’s undue market power likewise affects
broadcasters. Traditionally, broadcast signals were free but the
Copyright Act of 1976 requires cable companies to pay
broadcasters for retransmission rights of their work. 99
Retransmission fees result in seven-digit revenues for broadcasters
and broadcasters believe that such fees allow them to compete with
pay television channels, thus placing them at the foundation of
their business model.100 As a result, retransmission fees are often
the cause of heated negotiations, which sometimes can end in
channel blackouts much to the frustration of viewers.101

93

See 47 U.S.C. § 52(1) (2012).
See Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
95
See David Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable
Television Industry, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 511, 519–20 (1995).
96
See James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 975, 1006 (2000).
97
See Patry, supra note 30, at 385.
98
See id.
99
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
100
See Will Richmond, Aereo’s Court Victory Places Retransmission Consent Fees in
Spotlight, VIDEONUZE (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.videonuze.com/article/aereo-s-courtvictory-puts-retransmission-consent-fees-into-spotlight.
101
See Susanna Kim, Time Warner Cable Sued by Customers Fed Up with CBS
Blackout, ABC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/time-warnercable-customers-hope-build-class-action/story?id=19970548.
94

2014]

COPYRIGHT COWBOWS: DIGITAL ONLINE TV

797

Bundling is another vastly unpopular yet lucrative cable
industry practice. 102 Bundling consists of cable companies
packaging channels together, thereby leaving the consumer no
choice but to purchase a vast selection of unwanted programming
for the sake of accessing a handful of channels.103 Although cable
companies are heavily criticized, network owners possess
significant leverage by holding popular programming hostage until
cable companies acquiesce and adopt lesser-known channels. 104
Networks seem unlikely to give up this practice as it has been
estimated that only twenty channels would survive in an unbundled
world.105
Public frustrations with MVPDs and their internal quarreling is
an ongoing conversation from the popular cartoon South Park106 to
the floor of the House of Representatives. 107 This expanding
disconnect between the cable industry and the public has prompted
new legislative stirrings. Americans’ turning in droves to the
Internet has been a reflection of their frustration with the cable
industry.108 Americans need and want leaner package options that
contain content they actually want to view and serves their
needs. 109
House Representative John D. Rockefeller is
spearheading a bill calling for online services to receive the same
access to programming as cable and satellite companies to
undercut cable using market power anti-competitively in order to
limit online video distributors response to consumer demand. 110
Additionally, Senator John McCain is advocating the “Television
102

See Dan Bobkoff, The History – and Future – of Cable’s Bundling, NPR (Aug. 7,
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Oct. 2, 2013).
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See id. at 4.
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See id. at 5.
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for Expanded Choice, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.bna.com/
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Consumer Freedom Act,” which would allow Americans to
purchase preferred television channels “à la carte” and thereby
drastically lower their cable bills.111 A newly successful Canadian
initiative creating government requirements for à la carte television
may lend support to the à la carte television movement in the
United States.112
While lawmakers attempt to repair the relationships between
cable moguls, networks, and audiences, new technologies
unconstrained by old business practices and industry standards
have successfully responded to consumer demands. Aereo is
merely one battlefront in a war that is in full swing as television
migrates to the Internet.113 On-demand viewing services such as
Netflix and Hulu have become increasingly competitive and have
molded the new industry standard. Netflix currently boasts 30
million subscribers, which is ten million more than the nation’s
largest cable company, Comcast. 114 The amount of viewers
watching solely streaming content has become so significant that
Nielsen now accounts for online viewers in its television ratings
system.115 Nielsen also launched “Nielsen Twitter TV Ratings” to
paint a more comprehensive picture of modern audience
engagement by measuring the quantity and influence of tweets
about television shows. 116 Such developments underscore how
new technology has impacted the relationship between viewers and
content providers. The technology industry and free market have
created an audience-centric model, creating different viewer
111
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See Brian Stelter, Nielsen to Measure Twitter Chatter About TV Shows, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/media/nielsen-to-measuretwitter-chatter-about-tv.html.
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expectations and affording them more control, choice, and
engagement.
Cable industry officials are now in a bind to accommodate
these new viewer demands while maintaining sizable profits.
Aereo’s judicial stamp of approval has finally realized their deepseated fear of a formidable Internet opponent and will only lead
industry officials to attempt to draw in a younger audience who
finds them increasingly irrelevant.117 The television industry has
long been trying to rebel against this challenge to the status quo
and its stronghold on the industry by staving off “cord cutting” and
exclusively online television consumption.118
Cable companies’ primary tool to contractually fend off
Internet forces is content lockout.119 Cable companies put heavy
pressure on networks, preventing them from placing all of their
content online.120 As a result, while the network is allowed limited
online content to maintain relevance, its most popular shows will
still lock in viewers to watch on television.121 Another effective
strategy in ensuring cable necessity is requiring proof of a cable
subscription in order to access content online, such as the popular
HBO GO online feature from premium network Home Box Office
(“HBO”).122
Online services have weakened the content barrier by acquiring
their own programming as opposed to relying on existing
networks. While some, such as Amazon, have their own studios,
platforms such as Hulu and Netflix have entered bidding wars
alongside networks to publish production companies’ shows online
first.123 Netflix flexed its new market power in overcoming such
networks as AMC and HBO to acquire House of Cards.124 This
117
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CNBC (May 19, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100739314.
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See id. at 379.
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See id. at 408.
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acquisition proved to be a worthwhile investment as Netflix
recently made history as the first company to enjoy Emmy success
for an online-only show when its original program, House of
Cards, took home three trophies after fourteen nominations. 125
Star of the show, Kevin Spacey, credited the wins and ultimate
success to Netflix’s nontraditional distribution model and its builtin understanding of consumer desire.126 Indeed, consumers do not
want to wait week-in and week-out for the traditional serial release
of a show, but want the ability to sit with a story and binge-watch
at their own convenience.127
Cable operators have been unable to rely on the judiciary for
legal support when it has challenged major forms of revenue such
as advertising.128 In a recent ruling, cable broadcasters forcefully
litigated over Dish Network’s “Dishhopper” system. 129
Dishhopper allows subscribers to record multiple shows and skip
through commercials using the “Autohop” function. 130 While
watching television without commercials is a viewer’s dream, Fox
cited it as severely damaging to its revenue flow. 131 The court
ultimately held in favor of Dish Network, stating the process
underlying “Autohop” was permissible under the fair-use
doctrine. 132 The allowance of commercial skipping was a
particularly hard blow to broadcasters and it may have
permanently changed the nature of television. This new ability to
skip ads will likely result in the number of ad placements and
advertising revenue to plummet, thereby placing the industry in a
precarious position.133
125
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C. Online MVPDS: ivi
Aereo and FilmOn are not the first attempts at online
television.
As previously discussed, prior companies have
attempted to compete with the incumbent MVPD-dominated
market and have failed due to the myriad tactics employed by
MVPD to maintain its grip on the market. One service, ivi,
attempted a different strategy by claiming to be a cable company
instead of building a copyright defense.134 Its failure may be why
Aereo and FilmOn do not refer to themselves as online cable
providers despite the resemblance. The now-defunct ivi was a
Seattle startup that retransmitted live broadcasts from several
networks, including CBS, ABC, and Fox, to viewers nationwide on
a downloadable player for a low fee of $4.99 a month. 135
Broadcasters quickly brought a claim for copyright
infringement.136 The issue of public performance was not argued.
In fact, ivi did not deny that it was retransmitting broadcaster
signals, but proposed that it should be entitled to a compulsory
license because its operation as a cable system qualified it despite
not fitting the traditional statutory definition of a cable system.137
Section 111 of the Copyright Act codifies compulsory licenses
allowing cable providers to access broadcaster content. 138 This
section was enacted with the intention of creating a public market
for the cable industry that would nurture its growth in a manner
impossible to achieve in a completely free market while
simultaneously offering compensation to copyright authors. 139
However, there is no explicit mention of Internet cable service
providers, and the provision was clearly intended to address a
traditional MVPD system. The court acknowledged prior
congressional direction to construct section 111 as narrowly as
possible, thus making it inappropriate to allow the Internet, an
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unprecedented technology lacking FCC regulation, to benefit from
compulsory licensing.140
II. THE SEARCHERS: TO PERFORM OR TRANSMIT?
Public-performance jurisprudence provides for two approaches
that lead to drastically different outcomes. The first approach
defines public performance by examining the totality of
circumstances surrounding the performance itself and, in so doing,
emphasizes the overall outcome. The second approach considers a
transmission to be a performance in itself and is therefore
“transmission-centric” in focusing purely on the nature of the
transmission to determine whether it is a public performance.
While the totality of circumstances approach governed the FilmOn
decision, the transmission-centric approach first articulated in
Cablevision governed Aereo.
A. Totality: Redd Horne, Aveco, On Command, WTV,
Barrydriller, FilmOn
Redd Horne first presented the totality of circumstances
approach, the analysis of which centers on the work in question
rather than the recipients of a particular transmission, given that it
is doubtful that Congress intended to hinge copyright protection
upon the technicalities of delivering a work. 141 This approach
considers elements such as the location of the viewing, the nature
of the viewing, the nature of the transmission, the overall outcome
and any other seemingly relevant factors. The Redd Horne court
reasoned that the Copyright Act’s legislative history warranted a
broad reading of the public performance right. 142 The statutory
definition that opened the public performance right to original
works and any further rendition, the court held, meant that it would
be illogically inconsistent to constrain the right narrowly.143
While the consideration of private space, potentially including
peoples’ homes, complicates public performance analysis under a
140
141
142
143

See id. at 616.
See id.
See Gesmer, supra note 13, at 14.
See id.
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totality approach, it is not outcome determinative. The WTV court
followed On Command’s reasoning and stated that despite viewing
works on personal computers, works being available to viewers, as
the public at large, are determinative in deeming a performance
public.144 The Redd Horne court emphasized legislative history in
reiterating that the purpose of the revised public-performance
clause is to capture works being made accessible to a significant
number of people. 145 Therefore, the private nature of the
viewership was not a mitigating factor because the works were
available to the public at large.146 The On Command court opined
that the location of the performance does not equate a private
performance if the relationship between the transmitter and the
audience can be deemed commercial or public.147 That decision
also supports aggregating transmissions in providing that
transmissions occurring in a hotel were not to be treated
independently.148
The nature of the transmission is a matter of consideration
under the totality approach, but the Barrydriller court plainly
rejected treating a transmission as a performance.149 Although the
statute does not expressly define “to the public” or “performance,”
that court found that the definition of “public performance of a
work” was sufficient and rejected an understanding of a
transmission as a performance. 150 Furthermore, the Barrydriller
court found that Congress placed emphasis in the work itself rather
than the “performance of a performance.”151 The Aveco court also
considered the nature of the transmission. While acknowledging
the minor adjustment in the source of the transmission, the court
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did not consider the control detail dispositive. 152 Indeed, Aveco
reiterates that the overall functionality and outcome of the
transmission creates public performance infringement.153
The totality approach rejects single-subscriber systems falling
outside the scope of public performance. On Command cites that
Congress meant to target single viewer systems such as the one in
contention by providing that a public performance occurs when
members of the public receive a work in the same place or in
separate places regardless of time.154 The Barrydriller court also
disagreed with the shield created by a unique copy of a work and
deemed it judicial invention because the statute never refers to a
single copy of the work as a factor to be considered in making a
determination of whether a public performance. 155 Rather, the
language refers to the copyright work itself.
B. Transmission-centric: Cablevision and Aereo
Treating a transmission as a performance requires analyzing
the nature of the transmission itself and its potential audience to
determine whether it is a public or private performance. The
Cablevision court supported its reading of the text in the legislative
history by reasoning that it reflected Congressional hesitance to
create an overly broad right.156 The court rejected using the work
as a public performance analysis baseline along the lines of prior
public performance jurisprudence because doing so would render
the text “to the public” surplusage.157 The court further reasoned
that holding that the public at large could always be a potential
audience would misalign with Transmit Clause intentions, which
obviously
contemplate
the
existence
of
non-public
158
transmissions.
Cablevision established four public performance infringement
goalpost rules that work carefully in tandem to make this
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
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determination. The first and most important factor is an analysis of
the potential audience capable of receiving the transmission.159 If
there is a single-subscriber system, meaning that only one party is
on the receiving end of a particular transmission, then it is a private
performance, thus falling out of the public-performance
purview.160 Second, if there is a single-subscriber system, then the
transmissions should not be aggregated. 161 Third, if the public
transmissions stem from the same work and not a unique copy,
then they should be aggregated and deemed a public
performance.162 These factors find support in Redd Horne because
the holding relied on a video store showing the same copy of a
work to customers. 163 Although Redd Horne did not explicitly
describe the significance of the same copy being used, Cablevision
considered that analysis in “filling the gap” left by Redd Horne and
holding that a unique copy can function to constrain the potential
audience. 164 The Cablevision court held that a true single
subscriber system allowed by the transmission of unique copies of
works in a one-to-one transmission sufficiently constrains the
potential audience of a work thus bypassing public performance
consideration.165 Lastly, any factor limiting the potential audience
must be considered if engaging in a Transmit Clause analysis.166
The Aereo analysis follows Cablevision’s distilled rule: if the
public is capable of receiving a transmission, it is a public
performance, but if the potential audience of the transmission is
only one subscriber, the transmission is not a public
performance.167 The court observed that the primary Cablevision
features creating the single audience member for the transmission
were the unique copy of the work and the transmission of the
159
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unique work to a particular individual.168 The Aereo court found
that the Aereo system possessed the same two features and that
during the entire chain of a transmission, from the time a signal is
first received by Aereo to the time it generates an image, the
potential audience is of only one Aereo customer, and therefore
does not constitute a public performance. 169 Although the
plaintiffs argued that Cablevision established that an aggregation
of transmissions disturbs the potential audience, the Aereo court
disagreed. 170 Rather, that court opined that the aggregation of
transmissions would distort the focus back to the work, and not the
transmission itself. 171 Furthermore, agreeing with the plaintiff’s
analysis, the Aereo court found, would require the aggregation of
all of Cablevision’s transmissions because a distinguishing point
had not been established, and the court was not willing to do so.172
The Massachusetts District Court sided with the Second Circuit
in Hearst Stations v. Aereo.173 The Hearst court found the Aereo
explanation of the public performance clause to be more plausible
and endorsed the Second Circuit in its transmission-centric
interpretation. 174 It also found support from the rule against
surplusage, requiring judicial interpretation to give meaning to
every statutory term if possible.175 The legislative language stating
that the process of communicating a work from its author to the
ultimate consumer contains several performances further supported
the idea that a transmission may be considered a performance in
itself.176
The Supreme Court adopted a totality of circumstances
approach during the Aereo oral arguments. The Court was openly
troubled by the resemblance between the Aereo system and cable
or satellite systems rather than the technicality of the
168
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transmission.177 However, the Court was most concerned with the
current and distant abilities of the Aereo system, lack of royalty
payments, and the public-performance question’s impact on cloud
computing and equipment providers.178 The petitioners responded
to equipment-provider liability, stating that equipment providers do
not perform a work by selling equipment but rather a private
performance is later initiated upon use.179 They further argued that
Congress addressed this in 1976 and said that if a service was
being provided even if it could be reduced to equipment rental, the
person providing the service on an ongoing basis and in the
process exploits the copyrighted works of others is engaged in a
public performance.180 The petitioners also presented that cloud
computing and the Cablevision remote storage DVR are
distinguishable and permitted because of content ownership. 181
They analogized the systems to a car dealership and valet
parking.182 A car dealership provides cars to any paying stranger
similarly to a service that provides new content to paying
strangers. 183 However, a valet service holds and manages your
existing property just as cloud storage lockers hold user-owned
content. 184 Because users already own the content through the
underlying licensing or purchase, they may lawfully retrieve
content from cloud storage or DVR systems without violating
public-performance rights. 185
Aereo argued that public
performance should not be the contested issue because the case
presented a question of the reproduction right. 186 It relied on a
landmark Supreme Court copyright case, Sony Pictures v.
Universal Studios, Inc. (“Betamax”), asserting that the Court
recognized consumers’ fair-use right to make copies of local over-

177

Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, American Broad. Cos. Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., _U.S. _
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the-air broadcasts.187 Aereo further argued that it does not provide
content because a user’s assigned storage does not contain
programming until the user selects a program by clicking a
button. 188 Equipment providers such as Radio Shack selling
antennas do not pay copyright royalties, and thus Aereo is not
required to pay. 189 Therefore, as a self-purported equipment
provider, Aereo stated it merely creates an avenue for consumers
to use their statutorily granted and judicially recognized fair-use
right.190
III. HOW THE WORLD WIDE WEST CAN BE WON: SOLVING
PERFORMANCE ANXIETY
The Copyright Act of 1976 is at the eye of the publicperformance storm because it does not provide firm statutory
ground for the judiciary. Between the courts’ adoption of “the
Transmit Clause is not a model of clarity” as a mantra and the
statute severely lagging behind the times, there is a distinct need
for Congressional action. In Betamax, Justice Stevens emphasized
that an existing gap in the law should not be filled by anyone other
than Congress.191 Congress has the constitutional authority and the
institutional ability to accommodate varied permutations of
competing interests implicated in new technology. 192 The
challenge of filling the gap between new technology and old
copyright law without congressional guidance has left the judiciary
grappling with complicated public-performance issues beyond the
scope of its expertise, resulting in the Aereo’s incorrect and
damaging outcome.
Copyright law must support wider content availability in order
to appropriately and effectively address the interests of authors as
well as the innovators and the public. In the meantime, the

187
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judiciary must adhere to copyright jurisprudence to ensure its
integrity and maintain logical consistency.
A. Legislative Remedy
As Justice Fortas stated in his Fortnightly dissent, “[a]pplying
the normal jurisprudential tools—the words of the Act, the
legislative history, and precedent—to the facts of this case is like
trying to repair a television with a mallet.” 193 Similarly to
Teleprompter 194 and Fortnightly, 195 the courts have treated
Aereo196 and FilmOn197 under the regime of an outdated Copyright
Act.198 Despite legislative efforts, it is impossible to design laws
sufficiently predictive to capture every type of allegedly
foreseeable situation. Just as Congress noted in the 1976
Copyright Act, technical advances have generated new industries
and methods for the reproduction and dissemination methods of
copyrighted works. 199 This newly evolved business relationship
between authors and users makes it particularly difficult to enforce
existing copyright law.200
The explicit and widely acknowledged judicial frustration with
the statutory text is troubling. An overwhelming amount of
copyright holdings are consistently grounded in statutory
interpretation rather than theory. 201 While it is not always the
place of the judiciary to ground opinions in theory, its reliance on
statutory interpretation has been further hindered by the scant
support given by Congress beyond the language of the Act,
impeding the judiciary’s ability to shape consistent copyright
principles.202 The Court is often in a precarious position, forced
193
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between either seeking legislative clarity or picking up where
Congress has left off to fill in the gaps as a result despite Congress’
more valuable role of reviewing and addressing larger policies,
themes, and developments.203 Justice Breyer openly stated that he
was not confident in his understanding of what a decision for or
against Aereo could mean for other useful technologies.204 This is
precisely the type of question that requires Congressional wisdom
and legislative deliberation.
The judiciary’s inability to handle these cases is becoming
more apparent and decisions reached may undermine copyright
law rather than uphold it.205 Authors have predominantly felt the
effects because of court hesitance to expand the scope of copyright
without explicit legislative authorization.206 The Betamax Court’s
emphasis on constitutional text tasks Congress with defining the
scope of copyright, not the judiciary. 207 Early in the Court’s
history, it was inclined to deny authors the power to control or
benefit from new technology through copyright law and Betamax
interprets the language to mean that the Clause places the public
interest ahead of all others.208 Lauding new technology benefits
above all neglects other relevant liberties present in a copyright
claim. Authors are not a counterweight to the public interest but,
rather, are at the very center of the equation.209
Notably, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
intellectual property law more frequently than it expanded it,
particularly within the past fifteen years.210 This is a particularly
treacherous time for limiting intellectual property rights, because
the increased amount of stakeholders creates a wider net of impact
than ever before.211 The outcome looks bleak; moving forward, it
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is likely new technology will comprise most of the intellectual
property litigation.
It is time for the drafting of a new Copyright Act instead of
permitting the judiciary to continue in its attempts to fit the square
pegs of technological innovation into the round holes of the current
Copyright Act. The Internet must be the focus of a new Copyright
Act because it is the most impactful societal force since the
Industrial Revolution.212 The twenty-first century Copyright Act
requires twenty-first century enforcement strategies that “respect
the technical integrity and expressive capabilities of the Internet as
well as the law.”213
The breadth of issues Congress would need to examine and
revise is beyond the scope of this Note. However, even if an
entirely new act is not drafted, Congress should still specifically
address public performance. Despite the increasing significance of
public performance, especially within film and television, it has
gone unaddressed in the most recent copyright legislation.214
A renewed online television license discussion is essential for
two reasons: author protection and marketplace failure.215 Former
concern that retransmissions would occur without the ability of
copyright authors to privately negotiate is now a present reality
with no license, thus leaving authors powerless and profitless.216
The anti-competitive business tactics within the cable industry and
industry players’ attempts to maintain benefits for themselves
while underserving the consumer indicate massive marketplace
failure. 217 The cable operator ownership of the MVPD market
nurtures a misalignment of interest and incentives.
The
governmentally-granted monopoly power has shifted focus
internally and, accordingly, industry leaders are seeking ways to
212

See id.
See Pallante, supra note 134, at 326.
214
See Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: The ART Act, the NET
Act, and Illegal Streaming Before the H. Subcomm. on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011)
(statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).
215
See id.
216
See id.
217
See generally Ammori, supra note 65, at 405 (discussing Time Warner Cable’s
attempts to stop content providers from putting television shows online).
213

812

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:783

maximize their power and profits instead of outwardly seeking
consumer approval.218
A legislative remedy permitting online television viewing
while compensating broadcasters would serve the public interest
by restructuring the market and allowing broadcasters to maintain
a revenue feed that would not compel them to move to a pay
channel service. Lower barriers to entry for new distributors
would allow them to become legitimate competitors and create an
entirely new component of the entertainment and media industry.
Consumers would finally receive content from smaller networks
currently unable to overcome the bundling scheme.219
The Copyright Office (“the Office”) previously explored
licensing broadcast video over the Internet in a 2008 report on
satellite technology.220 The Office stated that it was not opposed to
delivering programming over the Internet but that it was
inappropriate for online companies to sidestep private negotiations
or operate without the Communications Act and FCC limitations
imposed on traditional cable operators.221 The former Copyright
Register, Mary Beth Peters, cited several protests to the idea.
Among those concerns were non-paying subscribers receiving
content, broadcasts no longer being restricted to local
retransmissions, and the lack of opportunities for copyright owners
to assess the risks of putting their works on the Internet and private
negotiations. 222
She also recognized that unconsented
retransmissions would effectively wrest control away from
program producers who make significant investments in content
powering the U.S. economy’s creative engine.223
Peters did not completely discount the idea and suggested that
if Congress found it appropriate, a new license should be crafted to
Internet distribution instead of amending § 111 of the Copyright
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Act.224 This solution would be the most successful. Attempting to
stretch § 111 to fit the needs of the Internet would fall back into the
bad habit of stretching old laws to meet new technology despite the
contours of the law not suiting its unique qualities. As previously
discussed, this was largely unsuccessful with early FCC
regulations of cable television.225 Licenses must be specified to
the Internet’s unique qualities to guard growth instead of inhibiting
future innovation or progress as well as feature low entry costs to
ensure that smaller programmers can be assured carriage. 226 A
compulsory license ensured to compensate copyright authors as
well as prevent content lock-out strategies so innovators can truly
embrace and build the online MVPD structure would reward all
parties involved as well as finally grant the public the freedom of
choice long craved for entertainment consumption.227
B. Judicial Resolution
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary, the
current Copyright Register, Maria Pallante, stated that the
unauthorized streaming of copyrighted content would only
increase in severity if technology outpaces legal reforms.228 While
the operative word in her statement is “if,” she should have said
“when.” To rely solely on legislative solutions is both ill advised
and unrealistic. In a tortoise and hare race between the law and
technology, slow and steady does not emerge victorious.
Technology has gone beyond the realm of outpacing legal reforms
from the advent of the CATV systems to Aereo slipping through a
judicially created copyright loophole.229 Assuming that Congress
will act promptly, comprehensively, and retroactively is hazardous,
so the judiciary must be better equipped to address publicperformance conflicts.

224
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The ambiguities of copyright law have long created Sphinxlike riddles blocking the courts’ path to appropriate adjudication.
Such a death of Congressional guidance is emphatically more
problematic when dealing with new technology. 230 As Justice
Stevens advises, where Congress has plainly not marked a course,
the judiciary must proceed with caution to construe the scope of
rights enacted by a legislature that did not contemplate the
involved calculus of interests.231 It is established that Congress did
not contemplate the present calculus of interests in drafting the
current Copyright Act.232 The Act was drafted when cable was a
fledgling industry and had not yet been addressed by a national
policy. 233
Although Congress predicted its growth and
significance, the same cannot be said for its current market power
or the other offshoot industries and interests at play.234 Therefore,
because technological change has rendered statutory text
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of its
basic purpose of encouraging authors and motivating private
innovators for the benefit of the public. 235 In his Fortnightly
dissent, Justice Fortas also cautioned the Court to inflict minimal
damage to traditional copyright principles and business
relationships until Congress had legislated on the issue.236
Public-performance jurisprudence has proven that new
technologies, such as the streaming services like Aereo and
FilmOn, highlight ambiguities in the Copyright Act’s statutory
terms. As the Aereo court stated, discerning between a public and
private transmission in the technological landscape of 1976 was
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much simpler than it is today.237 The Court’s trepidation during
the Aereo oral arguments emphasizes the liability danger the
present ambiguities pose to current and future beneficial
technologies.238 Keeping in line with Justice Stevens and Justice
Fortas, the terms and outcomes of copyright decisions must be
construed so as to uphold the theoretical underpinnings of
copyright law to preserve and vitalize technology for the public
good.
Cablevision correctly points out that neither “public” nor
“performance” is expressly defined in the Copyright Act, which
gave rise to the notion that a transmission in itself is a
performance. 239 The question here is whether examining the
potential recipient of a specific transmission rather than examining
the totality of the circumstances comports with copyright
principles. If the former approach is followed and elevates form
over substance, technology will as a result be developed with the
creation of truly individualized transmissions in mind. This was
already apparent with the Aereo system. The Aereo court
responded that this practice is not unusual and that even
Cablevision created its design for the same purpose. 240 In his
Aereo dissent, Judge Chin disagreed with the creation of a judicial
blueprint to sidestep copyright infringement. 241 Chief Justice
Roberts agrees with Judge Chin and readily dismissed Aereo’s
argument that its design is a necessarily efficient and cost effective
strategy for a startup company.242 While the Chief Justice does not
find it outcome determinative, it is difficult to reconcile this notion
with copyright law’s purpose.243 Although copyright law wants to
encourage private motivation using existing author works for the
benefit of the public, it cannot be said that Aereo and similar
services should be rewarded for designing in pure avoidance of the
law. Allowing technological copyright law circumvention runs
counter to copyright law’s purpose by implicitly approving the
237
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240
241
242
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misdirection of innovation energy which should be directed
towards the public benefit and not avoiding the law.
The seemingly nebulous line-drawing process in determining
when the potential audience is the public is also offered as
justification for a single subscriber exemption. Cablevision rejects
the “public at large” approach because the public could potentially
always be the audience for a performance and legislative history
points to a narrower reading to ensure “public” possesses a
tangible meaning.244 Examining this notion’s soundness requires
looking at what copyright goals are accomplished by constraining
public performance more narrowly and permitting singlesubscriber systems. The lack of authorization removes a weighty
obstacle for the innovator, thus enabling a wider audience to
receive content and promoting diversity of information. However,
the harm here largely outweighs the public benefit figuratively and
eventually literally. The potential broadcaster harm from the
Aereo system and other copycat services could be irreparable.245
Affected broadcasters have been explicit about efforts to maintain
their business even if it means moving to pay cable.246
A narrow reading of the legislative history is also not supported
by the text or copyright aims. Cablevision stated that Congress
feared an overly broad treatment of public performance as
evidenced by drawing the line for infringement at private, thus
cabining the right. 247 This acknowledgement highlights that
Congress did already draw the line between public and private for
the courts. The definition of private within the legislative history
is family and social acquaintances. 248 Although this is a small
carve-out, the remainder is also the ordinary meaning of public,
i.e., the community at large. This line-drawing also comports with
copyright aims. Maintaining relationships between large groups of
people and maximizing benefits for the masses necessitates a far244
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reaching doctrine. 249 If the public-performance right can be
constrained by the lack of aggregation, this could potentially mean
works falling under the scope of copyright would be unprotected.
Furthermore, drawing the line such that private individuals do not
have to obtain a license every time they wish to sing a song or
make use of a copyright work would broaden the scope of
copyright. Exposing individuals to copyright liability would not
only be inefficient but chill public desire to enjoy the arts and other
copyrighted works, which is the antithesis of copyright’s goal.
The Transmit Clause also supports a broad application by
reiterating that a public performance occurs even when the
recipients are not gathered in a single place or at the same time.250
The inclusion of potential recipients of “semipublic” places such as
hotel room occupants and schools is also reflective of the broad
nature of the clause. 251 If Congress intended a constrained
interpretation, it would likely be reflected in the Copyright Act’s
definitions section. For example, Congress may have implemented
an additional time element or required the recipients be gathered in
the same location. Congress acknowledges that closed-circuit
television and computers may one day be influential and although
they may not have known the specific outcomes, it seems apparent
that they included that language to ensure that the public did not
become tied to physicality.252 It had already become evident from
CATV system technology had the ability via wires to build
communities over long distances sufficiently determined to be “the
public.”253
The Aereo court openly acknowledges that application of the
Transmit Clause analysis should focus less on the technical details
and more on the overall functionality. 254 However, the two
concepts are not necessarily exclusive. Previously discussed
public performance cases did not put technical details of systems to
the side to focus instead on pure functionality; rather, both can be
249
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251
252
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254
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considered simultaneously.255 It is unlikely that Congress intended
for the results to differ based solely on the technicality of a system
as opposed to the actual results it produces. 256 A technically
focused interpretation implies that the harm the Copyright Act was
targeting was the manner in which material was being
disseminated rather than potential recipients.
Upholding the approach grounded in technical architecture
over that which considers the totality of circumstances leads to
logically inconsistent results.
If Redd Horne and Aveco
determined the private viewing booths in their requisite video
stores to be private performances, the court could have created the
precedent of small video store chains acting as movie theaters
without the appropriate license. Currently, the Aereo system is
allowed to operate as an online cable provider without any license
or regulation. 257 The Second Circuit explicitly prohibited the
operation of such a system in ivi.258 As Judge Chin acknowledged,
while public performance was not one of the issues to be
adjudicated, the outcome was the same. 259 The Aereo court is
correct in responding that the inclusion of private transmissions
within a system that resembles a cable system creates
complications and the court is also obligated to uphold Congress’
other expressed concerns in the Act.260 However, this approach
essentially disregards copyright law’s overarching purpose. It is
nonsensical for the Second Circuit to address the severe harm to
broadcasters in ivi yet condone Aereo despite both services
essentially creating the same outcome. This not only hurts
copyright law, but also damages the congruity of the judiciary.
The Court was apparently wary of inconsistent results when trying
to justify Aereo’s nonpayment of royalties despite its similarity to
a CATV system. While Aereo attempted to distinguish its
255
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company from a cable system stating that cable systems “push
signals down” to users while they are an equipment provider
allowing users to choose programming, it did not manage to
distinguish itself from services such as Netflix and Hulu. 261
Aereo’s weak argument that unlike Netflix and Hulu, its system is
different because it excludes people was quickly shot down by
Justice Ginsburg who points out that making services available to
paying subscribers is not exclusionary.262 This further speaks to its
content being available to the public at large because Redd Horne
established that requirement of payment is insufficient to make a
performance private.263
Economic harm has not been addressed in either the
Cablevision and Aereo court’s treatment of public performance.264
Cablevision dismisses On Command’s inclusion of commerciality
in its analysis.265 Congress did not define public performances as
being public commercial performances, yet it did explicitly state
that it had drafted the public performance right broadly without
mention of commercial business and created non-profit exemptions
because it is difficult to predict the profit schemes the future will
bring.266 Commercial considerations are therefore important to the
public-performance right, but they are purposefully not named in
the statutory definition of public performance in an effort to
intelligently draft a long lasting law.
The Aereo court also dismisses Aereo’s lack of a license to
transmit broadcaster works deeming it irrelevant for public
performance right considerations. However, Judge Chin observed
the Cablevision court explicitly stated their holding does not
generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all copyright
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liability by creating unique copies for individual subscribers.267 In
an amicus brief, Cablevision also stated that the Aereo case should
have turned out differently because Aereo was unlicensed. 268
Admittedly, Cablevision most likely is trying to protect the
copyright shield created for their system. There is also ambiguity
in the Cablevision court’s statement that their holding should not
apply generally to all content-delivery networks with a unique
copy subscription model because it may be referring to singlesubscriber systems being prey to violating other copyright laws
despite not infringing public performance.269 However, embracing
a totality approach would erase this concern regarding licenses.
By not accounting for a multitude of relevant factors underlying
the totality approach, the courts are vulnerable to falling back into
the pattern of Teleprompter and Fortnightly. The Court clung to
the Teleprompter transmission-focused rule despite the CATV
system evolution resulting in entirely different circumstances in
Fortnightly.270 Here, there is a very real distinction between the
Cablevision systems and Aereo that warrants serious consideration
instead of applying the same rule to each.
IV. DISQUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT: CLOSING THOUGHTS
The motivating concern of this Note was not to prevent damage
to the broadcast industry for the sake of fending off Darwinian
industry mandates but to assess the impact such mandates will
have on Americans. The current conundrum centers on how best
to defend the public interest currently under a dual threat. The
havoc wrought on broadcasting will primarily result in constrained,
lower quality content if the courts condone the unauthorized
streaming of broadcast television and pave the way for
Cablevision-centric designed systems to operate.271 However, the
267
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cable industry will not be given the appropriate incentive to
develop a more consumer-conscious business if the public does not
have the option of legally approved streaming broadcast
television.272
The public interest in widely accessible and diverse
information is built into the architecture of broadcast television,
thus significantly increasing the potential harm if the broadcast
industry suffers economic damage.273 By possessing a broadcast
license, companies are aware that the basis of their operation is an
obligation to serve the community.274 Historically, this community
obligation has naturally placed a great amount of trust in, reliance
upon—and afforded power to—broadcasters.275
A public service-oriented business does not translate into a
business with a loss-sustaining model for the sole sake of
preserving the integrity of its mission.276 Broadcasters have been
left with a twofold concern: they must reimagine their services and
content-delivery schemes quickly to stay afloat in a highly
competitive field and also take on lost revenue from decreased
retransmission fees.277 The more cost-effective Aereo service may
induce users to employ its services and leave their traditional cable
companies, thereby resulting in a smaller consumer base and a
decrease in revenue.278 In fact, the projected loss for broadcasters
if Aereo and other copycat services are given the green light is
over $2 billion a year, and could grow to up $6 billion per year by
2018.279
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Justice Breyer is appropriately sensitive to preventing the
public from receiving good content simply because a new
technology service cannot find the appropriate permissions from
copyright holders yet does not fit into the statutory copyright
scheme.280 Although many Americans may benefit from enjoying
the convenience of online cable, the increased information flow on
the Internet would not provide a balance for roughly 30 million
Americans who rely exclusively on over the air television without
access to cable or satellite.281 The public relies on television not
only for their daily dosages of escapism, but for local news,
community building through sports, enlightenment through
cultural programming, and critical information during
emergencies.282 A return to grounding copyright law coming from
the legislature and the courts is the only way to balance out the
involved rights for a judicious outcome and to truly ensure
diversity of information for the masses.
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